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Abstract 
In academic studies of the interface between developing countries and large multinational oil corpora­
tions, scholars have noted that over time and through repeated interaction, the developing countries tend 
to negotiate better outcomes for themselves: they progress along a learning curve by incrementally 
improving their outcomes through bargaining and strategic interaction. This phenomenon can be 
demonstrated in a number of oil-rich developing countries. Nigeria’s case, however, is more complex. 
During the two decades following its independence, the state successfully negotiated for more control 
over—made strides in the developing of the skills necessary to manage—its petroleum industry, as our 
model would predict. Then, in a puzzling late-1970s-to-mid-1980s change of course, the government 
abruptly gave back concessions, undermined local entrepreneurial endeavors, and repealed indigeniza­
tion laws. This paper combines, in the analytic narrative tradition, the case study method with an 
extensive form game; it applies a dynamic bargaining model to Nigeria’s historical experience, demon­
strating that Nigeria improved its outcomes and ascended along the “bargaining learning curve,” only 
to reverse policy and “unlearn,” with serious consequences for the Nigerian population. Even so, the 
demonstration of both successful and improved outcomes in past negotiations give evidence that Nigeria 
could once again ascend its bargaining learning curve if the government were to re-commit to such a 
policy. 
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Introduction 
The past 40 years have seen much written about multinational corporations’ 
(MNCs’) investments in developing countries, particularly in the area of nonrenew­
able resource extraction. This scholarly interest coincides with an exponential 
increase in such investments and often focuses upon either the exploitative nature 
of said relationships or the phenomenon known as the resource curse: a skewed 
economy in which the state allows a single industry to dominate to the detriment of 
all others. 
However, a small number of researchers have taken up this subject with an eye 
to understanding how resource-rich developing countries can do better for them­
selves within the context of their relationships with MNCs (Moran, 1974; Smith & 
Wells, 1975; Vernon, 1971). The intent of this article is to build upon their work, 
focusing its analysis on this bargaining interface—giving particular attention to 
Nigeria’s experience—exploring historical policy decisions made within the context 
of negotiations over oil concessions, and analyzing the outcomes and resulting 
effects on the Nigerian population. 
The framework for analysis is that of analytic narrative, or historical case descrip­
tion, combined with rational-choice methodology (Bates et al., 1998). The article 
presents Moran’s dynamic bargaining model as a lens through which the negotia­
tions may be viewed. The principal argument put forth is that Nigeria initially 
ascended its bargaining learning curve; this is demonstrated through an extensive 
 
  
form game that focuses on the dynamic bargaining between representatives of the 
Nigerian government and Multinational Oil Corporations that took place mainly 
between 1971–79. 
However, after this period the state abruptly reversed course. Numerous policy 
decisions were made that ﬁrst, gave back hard-won concessions to corporations, and 
second, repealed indigenization laws and forcibly deterred local participation in 
Nigeria’s oil industry. Through these actions, the state descended its own learning 
curve, with serious consequences for its population that remain up to the present. 
Although not the central focus of this article, an argument will be presented that 
posits that corruption likely played a determining role in the implementation of 
these otherwise puzzling policy decisions. Even so, the demonstration of both 
successful and improved outcomes in the negotiations that took place in the past 
give evidence that Nigeria could once again ascend on its bargaining learning curve 
if the political will exists to promote policies focused on long-term gains that would 
beneﬁt the greater population rather than short-term gains directed to the advan­
tage of an elite few. Given the scope of this article, the subsequent issue of what the 
state does with the increased (or decreased) share of the pie that it obtains through 
bargaining will remain for future research. 
The article proceeds as follows: The dynamic bargaining model that serves as the 
framework for understanding bargaining policy decisions is presented. This is 
followed by an overview of game theory, dynamic bargaining, and Bayesian equi­
librium analysis. Next is the case study of Nigeria: a historical overview of the 
bargaining policy decisions made by the Nigerian government is presented and, 
subsequently, modeled in an extensive-form game. Following this, the policy deci­
sion reversal that led to a “descent” on Nigeria’s learning curve is described. The 
article concludes with a discussion of the ramiﬁcations that these policy decisions 
have had up to the present day for Nigeria’s population, the government’s ﬁnancial 
state of affairs, and the eventual (in)ability of the indigenous populations to develop 
the monitoring, operating, and supervisory skills necessary to reduce dependence 
on the corporations. 
The Dynamic Bargaining Model 
Multinational extractive corporations must, in their search for unexploited 
resources, negotiate with the governments of the developing countries in which 
such resources are generally found. As such, states seldom have an established legal 
framework for these relationships and individual contracts must be negotiated. Yet 
because they are designed to cover all aspects related to a nascent yet complex 
industry, the contracts are often less than ideal and need to be altered over time, as 
conditions change. 
At the outset, the two actors enter into negotiations in widely divergent situations. 
The MNC has monopolistic control over the technology necessary to develop the 
natural resource in question. It also possesses a great deal of business and negotia­
tion acumen in the form of large legal teams experienced in the process in general 
and, speciﬁcally, as it relates to oil. Conversely, the developing country possesses 
neither bargaining experience nor expertise relevant to the development of an oil 
industry. 
  
With such a seemingly insurmountable inequity in place, many were surprised 
when, in the 1970s, academic observation of the historical record of MNCs’ and 
developing countries’ interaction found that over time, agreements between the two 
actors tended to become increasingly favorable to the developing country (Mikesell, 
1971; Moran, 1974; Smith & Wells, 1975). 
Theodore Moran studied the Chilean copper industry and formulated a testable 
hypothesis to explain this phenomenon; the resulting theory came to be known 
as the dynamic bargaining model. Moran writes of a learning curve for developing 
countries: over time they gain experience in bargaining and business and become 
better negotiators. Negotiation and strategic interaction incrementally improve 
their outcomes; they form contracts more favorable to their side—Moran (1974) 
calls this “ascending the bargaining learning curve.” As the states gain experience 
and conﬁdence, they take steps to ensure that their indigenous populations develop 
the technical and management skills necessary to manage the industries without 
dependence on the corporations. 
Successful ventures . . . provide an incentive for the host country to develop skills and 
expertise appropriate to the industry. Beginning with elementary attempts to tighten the 
bargaining process, the country starts to move up a learning curve that leads from 
monitoring industry behavior to replicating complicated corporate functions. (Moran, 
1974, p. 1) 
This article is concerned with the application of Moran’s theory to a case study of 
Nigeria in which the state’s historical experience in developing its oil industry 
and doing business and negotiating with large MNCs is examined. Moran’s 
theory builds on the Obsolescing Bargain Model developed by Raymond Vernon 
(1980),1 which states that when a bargain is struck and a corporation makes its 
initial investments, the bargaining position between it and the government 
involved immediately begins to change. The promise of investment is no longer 
a bargaining chip for the corporation and it ﬁnds itself with incentives to stay in 
the country: to avoid losing sunk costs and to reap the ﬁnancial rewards envi­
sioned in its proﬁt projections. As soon as the initial investment-associated risks 
have disappeared and the corporation begins to realize a proﬁt—in the case 
of petroleum, often a windfall—the host country starts to question the beneﬁt 
distribution proﬁle of the original contract. In retrospect, such agreements 
“invariably have the appearance . . . of  the  strong (company) cheating the weak 
(country)” (Moran, 1974, p. 160); this results in a developing country calling for 
contract renegotiations. 
Scholars of concession arrangements traditionally viewed these contracts as a 
one-time bargain reﬂecting a win/loss relationship between the two negotiating 
parties. In the 1970s this position began to change; Smith and Wells (1975) and 
Moran (1974) argued that this notion was unrealistic given the numerous renego­
tiations and even expropriations in the world oil industry during the 1960s. The 
“win/loss” viewpoint ignored changes occurring—both within the industry and the 
host country—that shift the relative strength of bargaining positions over time; 
these changes are ultimately reﬂected in the nature of the contracts. In addition, by 
portraying bargains as zero-sum games, the stark scenario employed within static 
analysis did not accurately reﬂect reality. In fact, contract negotiations allow both 
  
sides to realize a mutuality of interests, employing a non-zero sum perspective in 
which bargaining determines the division of rewards—the collective “pie”— 
between the two players. Thus, both may beneﬁt. 
Smith and Wells (1975, p. 246) directed future researchers to take into account 
economic, social, and political forces at work in the host country, the MNCs’ 
interests and position in the global industry, and the dynamics of the industry 
itself when analyzing contract negotiations. They lamented the fact that 
game theory (in the 1970s) did not offer a model sufﬁcient for a more dynamic 
view. 
The ensuing 35 years, however, have seen considerable advances in the nonco­
operative, dynamic, and iterated areas of game theory methodology and 
application—the areas speciﬁcally applicable to bargaining theory. Morrow (1994, 
p. 3) argues that game theory now provides a tool for all social scientists: formal 
developments have pushed the methodology in ways unimaginable at ﬁrst. He 
further asserts that it should be employed as a primary method of addressing the 
substantive issues that have arisen in the intervening years. 
McKern (1993) points out—on a related note—that host countries have shifted 
their bargaining priorities from a focus solely on ﬁscal beneﬁts toward a more 
complex schedule of needs and desires designed to realize both direct and indi­
rect beneﬁts. The application of a more descriptive, extensive form of game is 
thus a better ﬁt in this case; a reduced mathematical methodology can be insuf­
ﬁcient to an understanding of the entire range of the actors’ concerns—which 
can include political and social considerations far beyond those mathematically 
measurable. 
The need for a methodology that allows for more complexity follows logically 
from the increasingly multifarious nature of negotiations between developing coun­
tries and MNCs (McKern, 1993, p. 245). Host countries have moved, over time, 
from naively viewing MNC royalty payments as a “windfall reward” to a position of 
experienced negotiators dealing competently with taxation, ownership, and man­
agement, as well as with employment, environmental, infrastructural, investment, 
technology, and local economy concerns, among others (Moran, 1974, pp. 163–64). 
As some of these issues are more difﬁcult to measure quantitatively than others, a 
descriptive methodology that underscores the continued need for the case study is 
necessary. This is a point on which all of the scholars mentioned earlier would 
agree: they all have employed case studies in their research. 
And yet it is important that research does not stop at the case-study level. 
Qualitative and quantitative methods complement each other and ultimately must 
be combined (Odell, 2001). Herein is presented a framework for a systematic, game 
theoretic analysis of the MNC–developing country bargaining interface, one that 
can be—and has been—applied across relevant cases in conjunction with an 
in-depth descriptive historical analysis (Hosman, 2009), thereby combining quali­
tative and quantitative methods. 
Back to Moran’s theory: As previously stated, negotiations between the host 
country and the oil corporation are no longer viewed as a one-time occurrence. By 
taking strategic initiatives, the developing country seeks to strengthen its bargaining 
position in various ways over time. These initiatives may include a more thorough 
learning about the oil industry in general and the status of the achievements of 
  
nations in similar situations. A state enterprise may be established to monitor, 
supervise, manage, and eventually operate some or all of the industry involved. 
Training programs may be established to further this last goal by creating a skilled, 
indigenous workforce. It can be negotiated that this workforce be employed by the 
MNCs, that products purchased by the corporations be locally produced, and that 
equipment imported by the MNC becomes the property of the state upon its arrival. 
Further, the state may negotiate an increased level of equity in the contract or for a 
share of the ﬁnal product. 
This is not—nor is it meant to be—an exhaustive list of negotiable points; each 
country must decide what is best for its development path. Yet each issue represents 
a possible learning component on the part of the developing country. Each suc­
cessfully negotiated concession chips away at the MNCs’ monopoly of information 
and control; cumulatively, they shift the relative bargaining strength toward the 
host country (Moran, 1974, p. 165). 
A principle criticism of Moran’s theory is that it fails to account for the MNCs’ 
corresponding learning curve: by treating the MNC as an exogenous variable in the 
bargaining interface, it is considered to be a constant, with only the state allowed to 
change, improve, and learn. Although initially considered, giving equal consider­
ation to the MNCs’ bargaining experience proved to be beyond the scope of this 
article: the description of negotiations would have been twice as complex and 
lengthy and its focus on developing countries sacriﬁced. 
Nor does this analysis present a comprehensive list of all the players potentially 
affecting the bargaining scenario. There are, in fact, many possible actors that could 
affect the contractual decision-making process: the multinational’s home country, 
competing MNCs, the developing country’s state oil enterprise, and non­
governmental organizations or other interest groups. To maintain a suitably tight 
focus and provide for manageable games, this article has narrowed the number of 
actors examined to two. 
As such, contract negotiations between the MNC and the developing country are 
characterized as strategic interactions between two actors seeking a mutually accept­
able arrangement while each attempts to maximize its own proﬁt. This situation is 
sufﬁciently generalizable as to allow analysis through the methodology of game 
theory, the subject to which we now turn. 
Game Theory and Bayesian Equilibrium Analysis 
Given the preceding characterization of contract negotiations between MNCs and 
developing countries, when such contracts are negotiated the interface conforms to 
the essential tenets of game theory. The bargaining is strategic; this means that the 
bargaining position of each actor at each decision point is a function of the per­
ceived strategic preferences of the other player. The perceptions of these prefer­
ences are modiﬁed through a learning process. This updating of beliefs and 
strategies in response to the other actor’s moves is known as Bayesian equilibrium 
analysis. 
The game with which this paper is concerned is an example of international 
bargaining. According to Morrow (1994), interactions such as this should not be 
viewed as games of chance or games against nature with given, static probabilities. 
  
Instead, the negotiation process is better characterized as each actor making 
strategic decisions while uncertain about the behavior of the other. The 
probability assessment of each is shaped by a perception of the other’s prefer­
ences and possible responses. As such, probabilities are subjective and subject to 
change. 
The game is extensive in form. Players—each is seen as a uniﬁed entity—are 
faced with dual choices at each decision node. While clearly simpliﬁcations of reality, 
these assumptions are not to be seen as methodological liabilities; game theory’s 
strength lies not in accurate description but in generalization. It is this ability to 
reduce a complex strategic interaction to a form applicable to other, similar situa­
tions and, by so doing, foretell behavior that is valuable to the academic process 
(Morrow, 1994, p. 1). 
The strategizing, recalculating process of a bargaining game may be described as 
each actor identifying the available negotiating outcomes, ranking them to establish 
his preference ordering, formulating an assessment of his opponent’s perceived 
preferences, and using this assessment to predict his opponent’s likely bargaining 
strategies. 
Previous interactions with, or the historical reputation of, the opposing player 
may color a player’s perceptions. However, the absence of previous interaction—or 
one of the actor’s lack of experience in the industry or bargaining scenario—may 
create a wide margin of error in probability calculation. It is important that strategic 
recalculation and probability reassessment is possible after the actor better under­
stands the game and his or her opponent. An actor’s preferences are revealed by 
his or her moves; each is able to readjust or reassess his or her strategy based on a 
reﬁned perception of his or her counterpart’s preferences. Bayesian equilibrium 
analysis is characterized by this possibility for readjustment of beliefs in response to 
observed events; this allows for the concept of learning during the bargaining 
process. 
Collaborative effort can increase the size of the pie to be divided—and the 
absolute returns to each party—in the bargaining scenario at hand. Another of 
Moran’s charts clearly illustrates this concept (Figure 1). 
Game theory analyzes all possible strategies for each actor involved; as such, 
developing countries can gain signiﬁcant insight into their own behavior and 
strategies and become more efﬁcient bargainers. If a rigorous methodology is 
applied to the mapping out of its strategic interactions, a developing country can 
proceed more quickly along its learning curve or along a steeper curve, as illus­
trated by Moran’s graph (Figure 2). 
Logic, not complex mathematics, forms the core of the game presented in this 
paper; the extensive form was chosen to increase the game’s applicability across 
multiple situations. The intent was to provide a methodological framework for 
systematic analysis of the negotiation process, within the context of Moran’s learn­
ing curve concept and, by so doing, examine Moran’s assertion that developing 
countries learn by doing and that game theory offers a method by which developing 
countries can systematize and better understand the bargaining process, learn to be 
efﬁcient bargainers, and ascend the learning curve at an accelerated rate. The 
resulting game is applicable to the systematic analysis of bargaining between other 
developing country governments and MNCs. 
  
Figure 1. Moran’s Learning Curve Illustrating Total Returns to the Foreign Investor and the Host Country. 
Source: Moran (1974, p. 162). 
Figure 2. Moran’s Accelerated Learning Curve. 
Source: Moran (1974, p. 167). 
Case Study: Nigeria 
Since its independence from colonial rule in 1960, the Nigerian government has 
focused on, and become increasingly dependent on, its oil industry for revenues. 
Also since that time, Nigeria’s oil industry has been characterized by the dominance 
of large foreign corporations. Even so, Nigeria has realized a degree of success in its 
dealings with oil multinationals, steadily improving its position through negotia­
tion, at least for the ﬁrst two decades following independence. 
  
However, the argument will also be made that Nigeria could have been more 
successful in its endeavors. This is because Nigeria has failed to fulﬁll the more 
advanced stages of learning deﬁned in Moran’s theory (the development of moni­
toring, supervising, and operating skills to increase control over its oil industry). In 
the event, Nigeria did advance on its bargaining learning curve, as will be demon­
strated, but then the state took measures to give back the negotiated concessions. 
Instead of continuing to promote indigenous capacities to monitor, supervise, and 
operate its oil industry, Nigeria reversed course and actively prevented local par­
ticipation in nearly all areas of the industry. As it stands, Nigeria’s oil industry 
is controlled and run, de facto, by multinational oil companies (Asante, 1981; 
Atsegbua, 1992; Biersteker, 1980, 1987). 
Historical Overview of Nigeria’s Bargaining Policy Decisions in the 
Petroleum Industry 
In 1938, while Nigeria was still under British rule, the colonial government granted 
a nationwide monopoly oil exploration license (OEL) to the British and Dutch 
government-owned company Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum. This 
company, which later became the Shell-BP Petroleum Company, retained its 
monopoly control of Nigeria’s oil up until nearly the end of the colonial period. 
Shell-BP made Nigeria’s ﬁrst commercially viable oil discovery in 1956 and began 
exportation in 1958. International interest in Nigeria’s oil subsequently surged. 
Also in 1958, in the zeitgeist of the approaching end to colonial rule, the govern­
ment repealed a section of the 1914 Mineral Oils Ordinance, allowing non-British 
companies the right to explore for oil in Nigeria. 
As a result, Nigeria began granting OELs to a number of foreign oil companies 
even before its independence in 1960. However, the legislation governing these new 
concessions remained the Mineral Oils Ordinance of 1914, a vestige of colonial rule. 
The concessions granted by Nigeria to foreign oil companies at this time were full 
concessions: they granted across-the-board power to the oil companies for the 
entire range of petroleum activities. Nigeria received no compensation other than 
royalty payments (United Nations [UN], 1982). The concessions were also lengthy 
in duration: those agreed upon during colonial rule ranged from 50 to 100 years. 
Asante (1981) paints a bleak picture of concessions granted under colonial rule: 
In many cases the companies paid a nominal rent of, say, 150 Naira for a whole concession, 
plus one or two bottles of rum. There was no royalty in the modern sense, that is, a ﬁxed 
percentage of the gross proceeds of the resources. What purported to be a royalty—and 
this was a subsequent addition—was a provision for the payment of a minute percentage, 
say three to ﬁve percent of the declared proﬁts of the companies. (p. 25) 
Of course, without the business, pricing, or technical knowledge that the MNCs 
possessed, Nigeria had no way to verify declared company proﬁts. 
Following independence, the situation began to change, but Nigeria was not yet 
ready for direct negotiations with the oil companies, nor was it ready to participate 
actively in the development of its industry. In fact, in 1962, when the Italian-based 
MNC Agip Oil offered the Nigerian government the option to acquire a 30-percent 
equity share in its subsidiary company if commercial production of oil was attained, 
  
the Nigerian government—unprepared to venture into the unknown—turned 
down the offer (Asidou, 1979, quoted in Onyeji, 1990). Similar offers of equity 
interest in operations were made to Nigeria by both Shell-BP and Texaco, but 
because it lacked technical experience and bargaining skills, the government felt it 
safer to continue merely collecting rents on its oil. 
In the early years of independence, some of the advances Nigeria made with 
respect to the major oil companies involved the collection of royalties. The royalty 
system was revised to include a nominal rent payment for the use of land, an excise 
proﬁt tax, an import duties tax, and a small percentage tax on each barrel of oil that 
was sold. This tax was based on the price that the oil company declared it had 
received on the world market (which, again, Nigeria had no way to verify). Addi­
tionally, the concession periods were shortened in length, from 50–100 years to 40 
years (with the option for the lessee to renew for a further period of 40 years). They 
subsequently were shortened to 20 years, and later on, in some cases, to ﬁve. 
Despite these advances, Nigeria was still extremely dependent on foreign-based 
oil corporations to develop and run the industry and had little control over these 
corporations or, indeed, over the amount of revenues it could collect from them. 
However, it is important to point out that this situation of nearly complete depen­
dence on the oil multinationals during the 1960s was common to virtually all 
developing countries that possessed oil, many of which were just emerging from or 
still under colonial rule. This dependence also stemmed from the concentrated 
power and monopoly of technology that the “seven sisters” oil companies possessed 
on the world stage: their operations covered the full range of upstream and 
downstream oil production—from exploration and production, through transpor­
tation and reﬁning, to marketing and retailing the ﬁnished products.2 
Thus, during the greater part of the 1960s Nigeria played a passive rent-
collecting role regarding its oil industry, making no moves to renegotiate contracts 
with MNCs, unlike its counterpart developing states of Algeria, Iraq, and Libya, 
which took unilateral action in abolishing concession agreements (Onyeji, 1990, 
p. 86). Even so, Nigeria did witness a swift rise in the government’s revenue. This 
was a result of the growth in domestic oil production during the 1960s and from the 
higher royalty rates accruing from this oil. These revenues immediately became a 
bone of contention among the different regions of the newly independent state: 
under the federally legislated principle of derivation, the regions were entitled to the 
revenue generated in their own territory. Because Nigeria’s oil is located in the 
southern part of the country, the North and West were gradually being excluded 
from the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of the oil boom. 
As a result, the North and West formed an alliance to counter the Eastern region 
(which comprised the oil-rich South). This led to two military coups in 1966, the 
East’s secession from the federation, and eventually to the 1967–70 Civil War, which 
claimed 2 million lives. 
Although the ﬁghting of the civil war had a great deal to do with the prospect of 
future oil wealth, ethnic differences and rivalries were incited in the process. As a 
result, Nigeria’s oil boom, beginning in the early 1970s, came at a time when the 
state was concerned with the task of postwar reconstruction. The military leadership 
recognized that the reconstruction needed to be done in a regionally propitiative 
manner. 
  
Shortly before the cease-ﬁre, the federal government enacted legislation whereby 
all revenues would accrue to the central government, to be divided proportionally 
among the states. At about the same time, the military government issued the 
Petroleum Decree of 1969, which replaced the Mineral Oils Ordinance of 1914. It 
was the country’s ﬁrst major attempt at producing a detailed and comprehensive 
law deﬁning the rights and obligations of oil licensees. Signiﬁcantly, it also vested 
the ownership and control of all petroleum interests in the central government. 
This decree was issued seven years after the UN had adopted Resolution 1803, 
which afﬁrmed the principle of states’ inalienable right to permanent sovereignty 
over their own natural resources. Although now generally accepted as a basic 
principle of international law, its passage was a major breakthrough for developing 
countries. At the time of the UN Resolution’s passage in 1962, it empowered and 
gave conﬁdence to newly independent countries all over the world to develop their 
resources as they saw ﬁt and no doubt played a major role in the promulgation of 
Nigeria’s 1969 Petroleum Decree. This decree signiﬁed an important (legal) step in 
the government’s learning curve of how to do business with powerful foreign 
corporations. 
Not long after this, in July 1971, Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). Joining OPEC was a watershed moment in the 
development of the Nigerian oil industry. In fact, it would be difﬁcult to overstate 
the importance of this membership’s role in Nigeria’s gaining of knowledge, 
control, and bargaining ability with regard to its oil industry. Nigeria was able to 
take advantage of other OPEC-member country experiences and guidelines and 
adopt laws already enacted by these countries. It also gave a tremendous boost to 
Nigeria’s bargaining position within the international oil industry, as Nigeria began 
to negotiate for concessions and contractual particulars similar to those of other 
OPEC member states. 
OPEC was formed in 1960 by major oil-producing developing countries as “an 
act of protest . . . a  revolt against the highhandedness of the multinational oil 
companies” that had kept the price of oil “artiﬁcially low” (OPEC, 1984, p. 182). 
Events that led to the organization’s founding included the oil companies unilater­
ally abrogating and then reducing the posted prices for Middle Eastern and Ven­
ezuelan oil, ﬁrst in February 1959 and again in August 1960. This reduction of 
posted oil prices (which served as the basis for income under the existing royalty 
payment system) meant a sudden, unexpected reduction in revenues for the pro­
ducer countries. 
The shock suffered as a result of this unexpected and uncontrollable event, as 
well as the realization that oil prices had been kept artiﬁcially low by the multina­
tionals, gave these countries a strong desire to take control over the price of their 
product, and thus over their domestic economies. It also provided a strong ratio­
nale for these countries to join in unity against the powerful MNCs. 
The OPEC countries thus did “band together to form a highly effective bargain­
ing unit in dealings with major oil companies” (U.S. Congress, 1973). Some of the 
resolutions the OPEC member countries agreed upon over the next decade were a 
55-percent tax rate for all member countries and an increase in the government’s 
levy on each barrel of oil from 30 cents per barrel in 1970 to 65 cents per barrel in 
1971. The member countries also agreed to raise the posted price—the price at 
  
which they would sell their oil on the world market—with subsequent price hikes 
to occur at regular intervals. They further moved to gain control over their oil 
industries and prices by controlling the amount of oil that would be produced 
within their borders. 
Also signiﬁcant regarding ownership for the oil-producing countries was the 
OPEC/Geneva agreement signed in 1972 that required member governments to 
own a 25-percent equity share in the foreign companies’ operations. This rate was 
to be gradually increased to 51 percent by 1982, creating host country majority 
ownership in the MNC subsidiaries conducting business on their soil. Perhaps the 
most important OPEC requirement, at least as far as Nigeria was concerned, was the 
statute mandating the creation of a national, state-run oil company. The aim of this 
provision was for each country to learn how to run and control all aspects of its oil 
industry. 
Article 90 of OPEC’s Resolution XVI of 1968 enjoined member states to “seek 
participation in the equity of existing concessions” (OPEC, 1984), requiring Nigeria 
to acquire, by 1982, a majority participating interest in the oil company subsidiaries’ 
operations within its borders. This stipulation, along with the collective knowledge 
provided by fellow OPEC member states of oil industry workings in such areas as 
pricing, taxation, and contract negotiations, provided Nigeria with both mandate 
and conﬁdence to initiate negotiations and enter into new types of contracts with 
the oil MNCs. 
The Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) was formed in 1971 to fulﬁll 
OPEC’s membership requirements. It subsequently merged with the Oil Ministry to 
form the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1977. The NNPC is 
an agency of the federal government and exercises supervisory and regulatory 
control over the oil MNCs operating in Nigeria; it became the instrument through 
which the government was able to carry out OPEC’s participation mandate. In 
1972, the federal government vested all exploration and production rights in 
Nigerian territory in the NNPC, with the exception of those areas in which petro­
leum grants already existed (these would also become subject to renegotiation). 
Therefore, from this point in time, the NNPC conducted all contract negotiations 
with the MNCs. The NNPC was further empowered to prospect for, mine, and 
market oil and to engage in all other activities associated with the petroleum 
industry. This ultimately empowered it to monitor, supervise, and eventually run 
Nigeria’s oil industry—in theory. The discussion of whether the NNPC has been 
successful in these endeavors will be taken up later. There is no denying, however, 
that the state’s establishment of a national oil company played a central role in the 
expansion of Nigeria’s role in its own oil industry and boosted its conﬁdence and 
ability to negotiate one-on-one with the powerful MNCs. 
Following the establishment of the NNPC, the success that Nigeria experienced 
in negotiations is most clearly illustrated by two notable developments. First, 
Nigeria followed the lead of other OPEC nations and entered into new forms of 
contracts with the oil multinationals. Second, it negotiated for a greater share of 
both proﬁts and equity in existing and future contracts with the MNCs. 
Before launching into a discussion of the negotiation advances Nigeria made at 
that time, it is important to add to this historical overview two important govern­
mental edicts resulting from Nigeria’s drive to increase participation in and control 
  
of its oil industry: the indigenization decrees of 1972 and 1979. In 1972, the military 
government again heeded ongoing domestic calls for economic nationalism by 
agreeing to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, the ﬁrst of the two Nige­
rian Indigenization Decrees.3 The promulgation of this act was also motivated by 
the drive to meet OPEC demands; the decree’s strategy for action was control based 
on indigenous ownership and the need to use the oil industry as a vehicle for rapid 
economic development. The 1977 decree was an extension of the ﬁrst decree, with 
further-reaching and more stringent regulations. It served to tighten up loopholes 
in the 1972 decree (Biersteker, 1980). 
The decrees were intended to transfer a certain percentage of all foreign-owned 
businesses to Nigerian citizens; this included the multinational oil companies doing 
business in Nigeria. Other policies included dividing all foreign-owned economic 
activities into three categories and stipulating the level of equity sharing, which 
would be mandatory for each type of business, reserving certain areas for local 
capital. They further mandated that a certain percentage of Nigerians be employed 
at all levels of foreign-owned businesses. The policies were undertaken in order to 
reduce excessive foreign dependence and hasten the move to self-reliance in the oil 
industry. 
The Indigenization Decrees were important development steps for Nigeria in 
setting the legal context for bargaining with the MNCs. We will return to a discus­
sion of the effects—and effectiveness—of the decrees later. Next, let us examine the 
change in concession agreements once Nigeria commenced negotiations with the oil 
companies. 
Starting in 1971, Nigeria began direct negotiations with the international oil 
companies through its newly created state-owned oil corporation, the NNPC. One 
of the goals of these negotiations was to increase equity participation to meet 
OPEC’s mandate of, eventually, a 51-percent ownership interest in the MNCs’ 
subsidiaries. One method for furthering this goal was to scrap traditional concession 
agreements and negotiate for (at the time) innovative agreements such as joint 
ventures, participation agreements, production-sharing agreements, and risk 
service contracts. All of these new types of contracts increased developing countries’ 
participation rates and provided an avenue for the acquisition of petroleum tech­
nology and the training of Nigerians in said technology as well as in managerial and 
supervisory roles. The contracts spell out the legal relationship between the part­
ners and lay down rules and procedures for the joint development of the areas 
concerned.4 
The mere act of making such a speciﬁc, legally binding contract with each of the 
MNCs operating within its borders gave Nigeria a great deal of experience in terms 
of bargaining and doing business. Many aspects of these contracts were copied from 
those made in other OPEC countries—yet another instance in which Nigeria ben­
eﬁted from membership in the cartel and access to member countries’ otherwise 
conﬁdential information. 
Another of Nigeria’s goals for the renegotiation of contracts was a reduction in 
the duration of concession agreements. Nigeria was able to reduce terms of many 
agreements to a length of ﬁve years from 30 to 40. 
In 1971, the NNOC (later the NNPC) came to the bargaining table with the 
individual MNCs and requested a 35-percent ownership participation from each of 
  
them. In 1975, a round of renegotiations commenced, and the request was raised 
to 55 percent: in 1979, to 60 percent. Most companies signed agreements of assent 
to participation (at the 55-percent level) in 1974, and the policies became effective 
in the same year. Two holdout companies, Texaco and Standard Oil of California, 
ﬁnally agreed to the 55-percent level of Nigerian ownership in 1978.5 
The NNPC was also charged with the responsibility of awarding licenses and 
leases for oil development. The form that these new leases and licenses took, as well 
as the rights conferred and risks shared, were novel for Nigeria. These new agree­
ments included the OELs, Oil Prospecting Licenses, and the Oil Mining Lease. The 
NNPC reserved the right of revocation in all of the above if the licensee or lessee was 
not conducting operations continuously or in a vigorous and businesslike manner, 
or otherwise failed to meet the conditions stipulated in the agreement. 
In all of these measures, the changes in concessions and contracts reﬂected a 
fundamental shift in bargaining power between Nigeria and the MNCs. Nigeria 
commenced negotiations and successfully met its demands vis-à-vis the MNCs. 
There was also a marked increase in the government’s revenue from the oil 
industry between 1971 and 1980 (Atsegbua, 1992, pp. 26–27). 
The Bargaining Game 
The game modeled here is an example of international bargaining, characterized 
by strategic decision making by each actor under conditions of uncertainty regard­
ing the behavior of his or her counterpart, who, in turn, is trying to estimate the 
other’s likely behavior—a two-player noncooperative bargaining game under 
incomplete information. Probabilities and beliefs are not given or ﬁxed—they are 
subjective and subject to revision and recalculation. In this way, an opponent may 
reassess or readjust his strategy based on a reﬁned perception of his counterpart’s 
preferences through a revealed move. This possibility for readjustment in response 
to observed events characterizes Bayesian equilibrium analysis, which allows for the 
concept of learning during the bargaining process. 
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, a world consisting of two actors: the MNC 
and the developing country (or state). We further assume that the developing 
country has little to no experience in bargaining, while the MNC’s experience is 
extensive. In addition to bargaining experience, the MNC possesses intricate tech­
nical, logistical, business, and legal knowledge of all aspects of the oil industry. 
The developing country, on the other hand, does not possess such knowledge or 
experience. 
Each player possesses knowledge of the outcomes of similar previous negotia­
tions involving OPEC member countries and MNCs. In other words, both parties 
know that other developing countries have successfully negotiated outcomes similar 
to those that Nigeria is seeking. Furthermore, once the game between the state and 
one MNC has been executed, the other MNCs operating in that state will be aware 
of its outcome (and arguably more likely to agree to similar concessions). 
Each square or node represents a choice for one of the actors; the actor making 
the choice is labeled below the square. There are two branches from each choice 
node, indicating the choices available to the actor. The choice of any circle—if 
  
Figure 3. The MNC/LDC Bargaining Game for Nigeria.
 
MNC, multinational corporation; LDC, less developed country.
 
taken—represents an end to the game. A timeline below the game illustrates the 
real-time duration of the negotiations. An illustration of the game appears in 
Figure 3. 
This game is modeled on actual negotiations between Nigeria and the oil MNCs, 
beginning in 1971. As stated earlier, membership in OPEC spurred on these 
negotiations; the cartel required that by 1982 each member state possess at least a 
51-percent equity (ownership) in all local subsidiaries of foreign-owned oil compa­
nies. In the earlier game, Player 1, the state, makes the ﬁrst move. The state has two 
choices at this time: it can do nothing or it can negotiate for an increased percentage 
of equity/ownership in the subsidiary companies of the foreign-based oil MNCs. 
If the state chooses the upper node and does nothing, the game is over (the 
reader will recall that Nigeria made this decision on a number of occasions prior to 
1971). If the state negotiates for an increase in equity from the MNCs, then the 
game continues to the second play, where the MNC (Player 2) takes its turn and has 
two choices (or moves): either to accept or reject the state’s attempt to gain a 
percentage of equity in its subsidiary company.6 If the MNC rejects the state’s 
negotiation attempt, the game ends (and we presume that this decision is an exit 
option—that the MNC pulls out of the state because it does not agree to the 
increasing demands that the state is making on foreign corporations.)7 If, however, 
the MNC agrees to the state’s proposed equity increase, the game continues. In fact, 
the second half of the game—illustrated in Figure 4—is simply a repetition of the 
ﬁrst half as the state attempts, over time, to negotiate for an even greater percentage 
of equity/ownership in the subsidiary companies of the MNCs. 
The numbers within the parentheses generally represent payoffs. (In this case, 
they correspond to the percentage equity ownership under negotiation.) The ﬁrst 
number is the payoff (percentage) to the ﬁrst player, the second to the second 
player—should the option(s) leading to that game-ending node be chosen. In this 
game, the parties negotiate over the division of an equity value of 100, which the 
  
Figure 4. The MNC/LDC Bargaining Game for Nigeria with Payoffs. 
MNLC, multinational corporation. 
MNC possesses in full at the commencement of the game. It should be borne in 
mind that these payoffs, like the game itself, represent extreme simpliﬁcations of a 
highly complex reality and serve as a tool to aid in understanding the bargaining 
process. 
In the ﬁrst payoff, where the state does nothing, the payoff is 0 for the state and 
100 for the MNC, assuming that the state has 0 percent equity and the MNC has 
100 percent equity in the subsidiary companies at the commencement of negotia­
tions. As the rules for this game state earlier, if the state negotiates for an increase 
in equity of the MNC’s subsidiary and the MNC rejects, the MNC ceases operations 
and pulls out of the state. The payoffs in this case are 0 for the state, and –S for the 
MNC, which represents the negative sunk costs (losses) the MNC faces for having 
made its investments and then ceasing operations and pulling out of the state. If, 
however, the state negotiates for an increase in equity in the MNC’s subsidiary 
operations and the MNC agrees, the payoffs are 35 to the state and 65 to the MNC. 
The second illustration also depicts a break in the game at this point. In fact, the 
game could end here and a new one be started once the state attempts to renego­
tiate for a higher equity share, with the payoffs reﬂecting what has transpired in the 
previous game. Should the state decide to do nothing, the payoffs will remain as the 
previous game ended—35 for the state and 65 for the MNC. If the state negotiates 
for an increased equity share and the MNC rejects this—keeping in mind that in 
our game this means that the MNC ceases operations and pulls out of the state—the 
payoffs are 0 for the state and –S (sunk costs) for the MNC. If, however, the state 
renegotiates for the increased equity share and the MNC accepts, the payoffs are 60 
for the state and 40 for the MNC. Again, these numbers are meant to reﬂect actual 
Nigerian negotiation outcomes. If the state can succeed in arriving at the lower-
right (South-East) game nodes, its payoffs have increased (from 0 to 35 in the ﬁrst 
  
game and from 35 to 60 in the second game) and we can say that it has been 
successful in bargaining with the MNC. 
As noted earlier, the game and payoffs mirror actual negotiations that took place 
between Nigeria (through the NNPC) and the petroleum multinationals from 1971 
to 1979.8 In 1971 the NNOC requested a 35-percent level of equity participation 
from the MNCs’ subsidiaries operating in Nigeria. By 1974 most companies— 
including Agip, Marathon, Texaco/Chevron, Phillips, and Mobil—had signed 
“agreements of assent to participation,” which signiﬁed their acceptance of Nige­
ria’s negotiated equity level. In 1975 the NNPC raised the equity level to 55 
percent; in 1979 the level was again raised, to 60 percent. In both cases, the 
companies agreed to this negotiated level of higher equity for Nigeria.9 In terms of 
bargaining for increased equity ownership, we can conclude that Nigeria had (at 
least some degree of) success in the negotiations it undertook with the MNCs. 
Challenges to Nigeria’s Success 
The case has now been made that Nigeria did, in fact, do better for itself over time 
in bargaining and doing business with foreign-based oil multinationals: it ascended 
its learning curve. However, Nigeria’s is not an unabashed success story, and the 
argument will now be made that it could have done better in a number of areas. 
This section addresses the issue of Nigeria’s ultimate failure to gain the technical 
capabilities necessary to run its oil industry—why the foreign-based MNCs still de 
facto run Nigeria’s oil industry. It will argue that corruption played a determining 
role in the state’s return of hard-won concessions to corporations, the repeal of 
indigenization laws, and the forcible deterring of growing levels of local participa­
tion in Nigeria’s oil industry. 
Most scholars of Nigeria agree that the state negotiated considerable advances 
vis-à-vis MNCs following its independence. It gained higher oil revenues, increased 
its level of equity participation, and decreased the length of contracts vis-à-vis the 
oil companies within its borders. In fact, it assumed a greater role overall in its 
domestic economic activities. However, as Biersteker (1980), who has done the most 
extensive work in this area, points out, an increase in the state’s activities does not 
translate to greater effectiveness for the state, just as a simple increase in the level 
of equity in the oil industry does not equal an increase in the amount of control over 
that industry. 
Let us return to the impact of the Nigerian Indigenization Decrees of 1972 and 
1979. Domestically, the 1972 decree was initially hailed as a political and economic 
milestone for the government, a major step toward Nigeria taking control over its 
economy in general and over the oil industry in particular. And indeed at ﬁrst, the 
indigenization decrees effectively functioned to beneﬁt indigenous businesses and 
individuals. Yet because Nigeria did not come to possess the technological capabili­
ties to run the complex oil industry over subsequent decades and because the 
corporations did not implement many portions of the decree, including the 
employment and training of Nigerians in their labor forces, the decrees eventually 
came to be seen more as empty promises, even as measures to rationalize the 
presence of foreign capital in the economy. Later, the military government would 
reverse its course and eliminate the advances the indigenous groups made. 
  
In order to ensure passage of the ﬁrst decree, local businessmen joined forces 
and formed the Indigenous Businessmen’s Group. This group lobbied government 
ofﬁcials to endorse the decree. As a result of their efforts, the state initiated pro­
grams to encourage indigenous participation in the oil industry, requiring new oil 
concessions to Nigerianize not less than 60 percent of jobs at all levels and not less 
than 75 percent of management positions within ten years of obtaining their lease. 
Additionally, in 1970 the Central Bank of Nigeria introduced credit guidelines and 
stipulated minimum amounts of total lending for the commercial and merchant 
banks operating in the country; this was to target sectors of the economy (including 
the oil industry) and particular groups—notably indigenous private enterprise. To 
further assist local capitalists to get started in the industry, the NNPC organized 
indigenous individuals and small private companies to assist their entrepreneurial 
efforts to market Nigerian crude oil, beginning in late 1979. As a result of this 
encouragement by ofﬁcial powers, a number of local organizations—such as the 
Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Nigeria—emerged. 
This honeymoon between the government and private indigenous business was 
not to last, however. The growth of Nigeria’s oil industry during the 1970s coin­
cided with two world oil price surges and produced an unprecedented windfall of 
wealth for the country. Nigeria’s spending and investment decisions in the late 
1970s proved unsustainable and ultimately left the state unprepared to face the 
subsequent world oil price crashes of the 1980s. As a result, Nigeria faced a painful 
economic recession during the 1980s that affected the country nearly as profoundly 
as the windfall had in the previous decade. 
In December 1983, the army once again took power after allegations of massive 
governmental corruption, wasteful management of the economy, and mounting 
external debts in the face of declining revenues. The civil government was replaced, 
the short-lived Second Republic’s constitution was suspended, and many of the 
indigenous advances made during the 1970s were stopped and shortly thereafter 
reversed. 
Following the coup d’etat in 1983, state support for local capitalists began to 
disappear. The state took swift action to discourage further indigenous participation 
in the oil industry. One of the steps taken was to declare illegal the previously 
encouraged activities of indigenous groups, for example, the independent market­
ing and selling of oil. The state also revoked the rights of indigenous businessmen 
to make payments on credit while concurrently increasing the frequency and 
restricting the acceptable methods of payments required to continue operating in 
the oil industry. The multinational oil companies faced none of these restrictive 
actions. 
The NNPC further edged out local companies by not renewing their contracts 
or by choosing foreign-based companies in competitive processes. By the end of 
1985, the government had rather successfully curtailed indigenous participation 
in the oil industry. Of all the local private companies that had emerged in the 
encouraging atmosphere of the 1970s, only one survived by the early 1980s: the 
Nigus Petroleum Company. Its operations were restricted to the exploration stage 
only (Onyeji, 1990, pp. 104–5). It was denied permits to participate in all other 
areas of petroleum development even though it had applied for them. In fact, to 
give an example of the change in the state’s priorities, in 1983, out of 13 permits 
  
issued by the NNPC to do exploratory work for future oil pipeline routes, 12 
went to just four foreign oil companies. The single remaining permit was 
reserved for the NNPC. However, in the following year the NNPC turned this 
permit over to Shell BP because it did not possess the capabilities to carry out the 
survey operation itself. Clearly then, the government’s reversal of its policy that 
originally encouraged local entrepreneurship played a key role in discouraging 
indigenous participation and limiting local control in Nigeria’s oil industry. In 
addition, the state deterred locals from gaining employment or experience within 
the industry by not enforcing employment quotas stipulated for the MNCs by the 
Indigenization Decrees. This further hindered the country’s stated desire to 
control its oil industry. 
To make matters worse, in 1977, even as Nigeria negotiated for a higher level of 
equity in the MNC subsidiaries, it was taking counter measures to “sweeten the 
deal” for the MNCs by offering them a package of ﬁscal incentives that were 
unprecedented in their level of generosity. These included the following: The ﬁrst 
was an exploration incentive, whereby the government agreed to pay for any 
unsuccessful wells. The second was a petroleum proﬁt tax, which provided for the 
write-off of pre-production costs and further offered a reduced tax rate to the 
companies that allowed them to pay just 15 percent instead of the OPEC-standard 
rate of 85 percent. The third was a royalty incentive, which offered a lower rate of 
royalties than the going OPEC rate for oil found offshore, which is where large 
quantities of Nigerian crude had recently been discovered. The fourth was the 
investment tax credit, which encouraged and rewarded oil companies for making 
new investments in the country. This provided a tax bonus for any asset obtained 
for the purpose of petroleum operations in an amount equal to the investment. A 
ﬁfth incentive offered that companies could recover their investments in ﬁve equal 
installments, in line with the trend in international oil markets (Onyeji, 1990, 
pp. 91–96). 
In all of these incentives the state appears to be giving back to the oil companies 
the advances it made in the negotiations since bargaining had begun, just six years 
earlier. It is puzzling why Nigeria would consider such an incentive package to be 
in its best interest because no other OPEC countries did this either at that time or, 
indeed, at any time up to the present. In fact, by this time, many developing 
countries had “learned” the negotiation tactic of playing MNCs off each other to 
obtain further concessions (Singh, 2000, 2008). This was something Nigeria was 
perfectly positioned to do. The MNCs in Nigeria were not eager to leave the 
country: they had high-sunk costs and were already earning considerable proﬁts 
from Nigeria’s high-quality oil. 
While Nigeria’s motivation in offering this package to the corporations was, 
arguably, to encourage investment and exploration, in the long run it meant 
considerably lower earnings. As will be argued later, the overly generous incentives 
given to the MNCs were likely the result of a marked increase in corruption on the 
part of the Nigerian government and its representatives in the NNPC that altered 
the assumptions and perceived payoffs for the actors in negotiations. It is possible 
that those bargaining on behalf of the state came to believe that a short-term 
outcome that would beneﬁt them (or those in power) on a personal level, combined 
with a negligible risk of being held accountable for such behavior, outweighed the 
  
importance of any longer-term considerations. We are not privy to the actual 
negotiations, yet backward induction may be employed to determine what players 
perceived as their optimal move(s). In this case, we know that government-level 
corruption reached unprecedented levels in Nigeria during the period from the 
late 1970s through the mid-1980s, increasing through multiple, quick succession 
changes of leadership. This external shift in political realities may have, in turn, 
shifted the actors’ assumptions and perceived payoffs. It would, in fact, be possible 
to formulate a new extensive form game based upon the observed outcomes from 
this new round of negotiations. However, it is beyond the scope and length limita­
tions of this article to do so. 
In terms of acquiring the skills necessary to increase participation in and control 
over the country’s own oil industry, Biersteker (1987) argues that the MNCs ﬁgured 
out methods to retain de facto control over their subsidiaries, so that losing equity as 
a result of the negotiations was not a serious threat to either their operations or 
their proﬁtability. Biersteker asserts that the MNCs have retained day-to-day 
control over the oil industry in Nigeria; in his interviews with senior executives of 
23 of the largest MNCs operating in Nigeria, none expressed concern over loss of 
power because of Nigeria’s increased equity participation. In fact, they have main­
tained effective managerial control regardless. 
The MNCs have also retained their technical expertise by not training Nigerians, 
and in many cases they have managed to obtain exemptions from regulations not to 
their liking, as the state never enforced the few regulatory provisions that did make 
their way into negotiated agreements. Thus, Nigerians did not obtain skills in 
Moran’s more advanced categories of knowledge: the operating and supervisory 
skills necessary to run their own oil industry and reduce dependence on foreign 
corporations. 
The NNPC, in which so much hope was placed for taking control of Nigeria’s oil 
industry, has also fallen short of expectations in a number of ways. Although it was 
intended to grow into an organization engaged in the entire spectrum of upstream 
and downstream oil development, it has remained almost a strictly administrative 
body, only marginally involved in the exploratory stage of oil development. While 
it saved for itself a number of the licenses it had the power to grant, it never used 
any of them (Onyeji, 1990, p. 118). Furthermore, as of the 1990s, the NNPC did not 
own any of the equipment or facilities used in oil operations; those that it uses, it 
rents from the MNCs. Even in the exploration arena, the NNPC depended on the 
MNCs for both equipment and technology. Similarly, the six port terminals used for 
the export of oil were built and remain owned by MNCs, while all the tankers that 
transport oil out of Nigeria are also foreign owned, and again the NNPC rents those 
that it uses. By renting all of the equipment and materials listed earlier, Nigeria 
actually pays multiple times over not only for the ﬁnal product—reﬁned oil, most of 
which it must import—but also for the very possibility of engaging in the operation 
of its own oil industry. 
As of 2003, the government had been defaulting on its funding and payments to 
its joint venture partners—the MNC oil companies—for years. As these debts must 
be paid back with interest, the use of the term “joint venture” appears increasingly 
specious (Akinrele, 2003, emphasis added). During this time, and as a stated result 
of the NNPC’s corruption levels, the government curtailed its access to funding. 
  
This hindered the NNPC’s ability to cover payment arrears as well as the possibility 
of forming future joint ventures. 
Additionally, Nigeria’s oil reﬁneries suffer intermittent shutdowns and are oper­
ating well below installed capacity. Resulting shortages have caused the country’s 
heavy reliance on imported petroleum products, which has served to deplete 
foreign exchange earnings. This also means that continued subsidization of oil in 
Nigeria becomes increasingly expensive for the government, while threats to lift 
these subsidies result in riots, strikes, and other violent acts by the Nigerians. 
Because Nigerians know that the oil sector lies at the root of many of their prob­
lems, violence against the MNCs’ property and employees has mushroomed over 
the years as well. 
In addition to the above, there are still other challenges facing the NNPC. 
Nigeria is known for being an extremely corrupt country10; this corruption has 
affected the NNPC. In 1979, around the same time that the concessions were 
being given back to the MNCs, the NNPC was accused of “losing” 2.4 billion 
Naira from its accounts. This money was later discovered to be deposited in 
private accounts of NNPC employees at the British Midland Bank in London. An 
additional 12 billion Naira was reported missing through secret oil contracts 
involving third-party agents. Even when these contracts were considered legiti­
mate, the contractual middlemen would regularly keep the NNPC’s money 
in their own private accounts longer than agreed upon, taking advantage of 
Nigeria’s rising inﬂation rates to make even more money on the sales (Onyeji, 
1990, pp. 122–23). 
Following closely upon the heels of the above, a Nigerian newspaper reported 
that 2.8 billion Naira was missing from the NNPC’s coffers (Igweonwu, 1984, 
p. 272; Onyeji, 1990). As a result, in 1980 a Judicial Commission of Inquiry was set 
up to investigate these claims. Although the tribunal did not discover the where­
abouts of the missing money, it reported other ﬁndings that contributed to the 
NNPC’s record of scandals. One of these was that none of the service contracts 
executed between the NNPC and the operating companies had ever been signed 
and approved and were therefore still operating as “gentlemen’s agreements.” This 
situation was ﬁnally rectiﬁed in 1991 (Akinrele, 2003). Further, the tribunal 
reported that because of corrupt NNPC policies, such as those mentioned earlier, 
the government had lost 2.5 billion Naira in oil revenue, just from the years 1975 
to 1978 (Onyeji, 1990). As a result of its ﬁndings, the tribunal proposed a funda­
mental reorganization of the NNPC including forming ﬁve wholly owned subsid­
iaries to carry out the various upstream and downstream oil industry functions, 
which the NNPC had not yet developed the capabilities to undertake in any case 
(Igweonwu, 1984). This restructuring was recommended to shift a great deal of 
authority away from the chief executive of the NNPC, who had up to that point 
wielded an inordinate “concentration of power” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1980). Financial control was also wrested from the NNPC, with the result that the 
NNPC now needs government approval for almost any signiﬁcant ﬁnancial deci­
sions or investments (Akinrele, 2003). 
Thus, evidence exists of the presence of the kind of corruption typically 
associated with negotiations over petroleum: secret deals that pad the bank 
accounts of those in the position to beneﬁt from their closed-door, undisclosed 
  
nature. This type of corruption—basically bribery—is common to negotia­
tions between representatives from developing countries and multinational oil 
corporations. 
In contrast, the Nigerian government’s decision to proactively wipe out what had 
up to then been increasingly successful local participation in the petroleum sector 
may also be attributable to corruption, but it most likely did not come about as a 
result of the negotiations with MNCs and was rather a policy taken by a government 
coming to embody a patronage system that prioritized the enrichment and 
entrenchment of its elites. This type of sabotage of previously existing local eco­
nomic participation in the petroleum industry seems to be unique to Nigeria, and 
corporations do not generally bargain for this in their negotiations, as they gener­
ally realize that some level of indigenous participation in the petroleum sector is, in 
fact, in their best interests—it helps locals feel that they are beneﬁting from the 
presence of a petroleum industry. An absence of local participation in this industry 
can lead to local resentment—particularly if there is a lack of other employment 
opportunities in the area—and can, in the extreme, lead to violence against the 
MNCs if they come to be identiﬁed with the lack of economic opportunity or 
development, exactly as has become the case in Nigeria. 
In both cases, therefore, the puzzling “unlearning” evidenced through the rever­
sal of previous policies appears to be Nigeria’s own doing, the result of increased 
levels of unchecked corruption and the related recalculation of self-interested, 
short-term strategies and not the result of the MNCs actually reasserting themselves 
and winning the upper hand through negotiations. 
The silver lining to this otherwise unfortunate state of affairs is that Nigeria has 
demonstrated both learning and improved bargaining outcomes in the past. If the 
government is willing to recommit itself to the reduction of corruption and discon­
tinuation of the elite-dominated patronage system and restore an emphasis on the 
development of its oil industry that takes a long-term perspective, progress and 
more favorable outcomes are possible. Further, the methodology presented here—a 
systemized use of game theory in which all assumptions are stated and strategies 
revealed—offers a procedure by which a developing country can reﬁne its under­
standing of the game at hand, discover a way to do better for itself, and thus 
improve its negotiating skills. 
Conclusion 
This article applied Theodore Moran’s dynamic bargaining theory—that develop­
ing countries do better for themselves over time as their experience with bargaining 
grows—to the speciﬁc case of Nigeria. It showed that game theory, and speciﬁcally 
Bayesian equilibrium analysis, can be a useful methodology for states to employ in 
this development interface, as it forces each player to take into consideration not 
just its own position but all the possible strategies and moves of its opponent before 
acting. Once a move has been made and a preference revealed, the player can 
adjust beliefs, recalculate expected probabilities and values, and better plan the 
next move. 
A further argument for the use of such modeling of strategic interaction, par­
ticularly for developing countries, is that formal modeling forces a thorough 
  
analysis of the situation at hand. This obligates the player to state its knowledge, 
assumptions, and beliefs in entirety as well as its knowledge, beliefs, and assump­
tions about the other player at every potential stage of the game. Doing so may 
expose unstated information, reveal a gap in the knowledge about the game—or 
about the other player—and/or even lead to the realization of alternate moves 
or superior strategies. A complete knowledge of the game allows a player to 
act in a rational, consistent manner and, as in the game described earlier, to 
readjust beliefs as events change and eventually discover a way to do better for 
itself. 
Although the previous section painted a rather dismal picture of Nigeria’s ulti­
mate ability to run its own oil industry, it is important to remember that the country 
did make advances on its bargaining learning curve, particularly during the 1960s 
and 1970s. As such, Nigeria’s situation serves as a valuable case study. The game 
presented an example of Nigeria’s success in bargaining, an ascension on its learn­
ing curve. However, it also would have been possible to construct a game analyzing 
the concessions Nigeria made to the oil companies in the form of the ﬁscal incen­
tives package of 1977, a game in which Nigeria negated the negotiated ownership 
advances made during the same decade. In other words, Nigeria arguably 
descended the learning curve. 
The factors contributing to Nigeria’s stumbling blocks have been described 
earlier. According to Moran’s theory, Nigeria—through both active and passive 
measures—failed to acquire two necessary components for eventual control of its oil 
industry: the supervisory and operational skills necessary to run such a technologi­
cally complex industry. This article further made the case that a precipitous rise in 
corruption may help explain the government’s otherwise puzzling reversal of 
policies, beginning in the late 1970s, that ceased enforcement of successful pro­
grams, forced Nigerian entrepreneurs out of the market, gave back important 
advances through extremely generous concessions to the MNCs, and even repealed 
indigenization laws. 
Yet this need not have been the case: other OPEC countries such as Algeria, 
Brazil, Venezuela, and Indonesia—none of which have been immune to 
corruption—have achieved success in the acquisition of the skills and technology 
necessary to run their own oil industries (Atsegbua, 1992). However, Nigeria’s 
situation can change for the better: a serious governmental commitment either to 
seeing through the policies commenced in the 1970s or to setting forth a new set of 
policies that systematically promote indigenous development of the skills necessary 
to supervise, manage, and operate the oil industry would set Nigeria on a course 
toward an increase in its control over this industry. In the end, Nigeria’s case 
provides a cautionary tale to the effect that without governmental commitment, 
early victories do not guarantee continued success: ascension on the bargaining 
learning curve is not a given. 
Notes 
1 See Vernon (1980). This concept was also thoroughly elaborated upon by Mikesell (1971, pp. 35–37) 
and touched upon by Penrose (1959) in her discussion of exploitation of host countries by the oil 
companies. However, the theory is generally attributed to Vernon. 
  
2 The major international oil companies widely known as the “seven sisters” were British Petroleum, 
Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, Standard Oil of California, and Texaco. See also Penrose 
(1971). 
3 The state did not, in fact, initiate this decree. It reacted to pressures from indigenous local capital and 
large MNCs in ﬁnally agreeing to the decree. The ﬁnal composition of the decree, as well as its results, 
reﬂect this collaboration. See Biersteker (1987). 
4 Joint Ventures can include the following features: the Participation Agreement, which is negotiated 
on an individual basis and speciﬁes the respective rights and duties of the parties; the Operating 
Agreement, spelling out the rules and procedure for the joint development of the areas concerned 
and the property jointly owned by the partners; and the Memorandum of Understanding, also 
signed on an individual basis, which commits the parties in the future to speciﬁed exploration, 
production, and work programs. There is further the Production Sharing Agreement, which, at the 
time that Nigeria signed its ﬁrst (and only, for at least a decade) proﬁt sharing agreement (PSA) in 
1971 with Ashland Oil, was considered a novel type of agreement. In fact, Indonesia was the pioneer 
of this type of agreement, and Nigeria was extremely slow to adopt or negotiate for the PSA—and 
arguably far less successful in enforcing it. 
5 These ﬁgures are given to provide an overview and are not comprehensive. For example, from 1979 
to 1989, Nigeria held an 80-percent share of equity in the Shell/BP subsidiary. It is, however, beyond 
the scope of this chapter to go into much greater detail regarding all of Nigeria’s equity agreements 
with the various MNCs. 
6 This is a simpliﬁcation for the purposes of keeping the game concise. In point of fact, the MNC could 
try to negotiate for a lower equity percentage to be transferred to the state, but this possibility alone 
would have resulted in virtually unlimited branches representing the choices available to the actors. 
7 Biersteker (1980, p. 214) reports that only one of the hundreds of large, transnational corporations 
operating in the country has chosen an exit option and pulled out of Nigeria because of its increasing 
demands on foreign operations. 
8 In fact, the game could be used to consider negotiations between a number of OPEC member states 
and foreign-based oil MNCs as these developing countries negotiated for (OPEC-mandated) 
increased equity shares of MNC subsidiaries within their borders. 
9 These equity levels and the years mentioned earlier apply to the majority of MNCs in Nigeria but do 
not apply uniformly for all of them. To give an example, Texaco and Standard of California 
announced their ﬁnal agreement on a 55-percent equity in 1978. 
10 Transparency International has published an annual Global Corruption Report since 1999. In each 
year from 1999 to 2004, Nigeria ranked second from the last (meaning most corrupt) among all 
countries in the survey. In 2005, it moved up to tie for sixth from last place. Data and rankings are 
available at http://www.transparency.org. However, as of 2008, Nigeria had moved up signiﬁcantly in 
these rankings, tied at 121st place (out of 180). 
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